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
JOINT ORGANIZATION: WHERE DO WE GO AFTER
GOLDWATER-NICHOLS?

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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JOINT ORGANIZATION: WHERE DO WE GO
AFTER GOLDWATER-NICHOLS?

by

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A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
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REQUIREMENT

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AIR WAR COLLEGE RESEARCH REPORT ABSTRACT

TITLE: Joint Organization: Where Do We Go After Goldwater-Nichols?

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From the Spanish American War through the Iranian Crisis and the Invasion of Grenada, there have been ineffectiveness and growing inefficiency when the military services of the United States were working together. Since the end of World War II there have been more than 35 attempts to streamline the military. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was the latest measure to make the individual services into a more effective, cohesive organization.

Goldwater-Nichols has changed emphasis from the individual services to increased joint efficiency. It increased the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and has given more autonomy to the major area commanders (CINCs). The Act also created a joint specialty officer to enhance the effectiveness of joint operations.

While increased efficiency and effectiveness of the military has been the goal of all organization attempts, there are still numerous obstacles to overcome. The differences between individual services' doctrine makes communication and coordination difficult. The creation of joint doctrine should improve the efficiency but will take

time and increased practice as each service learns the "new language" needed to operate jointly.

Other areas that must be improved are the interoperability of equipment and logistics of the services within the major warfighting Commands. With limited funding and resources the services cannot afford to duplicate efforts in the areas of communication, supply and medical support.

This is not a recommendation to become a single "purple suited" service. We must take the maximum advantage of esprit de corps and leadership that arise from tradition and organization pride. But the effort of all the services must be coordinated and unified to a single ultimate goal if joint operations are to be successful.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was a major step in improving both the efficiency and effectiveness of the United States military organization. However, it also created additional red tape and bureaucratic obstacles that detract from its designed increase of effectiveness.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the United States' shift in military policy from one primarily aimed at specific service operations to one that emphasizes combined, joint operation and cooperation from all the individual services. This study does not attempt to delve into the intricate details of running specific campaigns or actual military actions. It is aimed at providing an overview of the organization of the Department of Defense and the causes and effects of recent reorganization legislation such as the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, and to suggest possible solutions to remaining problems.

This paper will take a look at some of the historical basis for establishing priority on one large complex organization striving after common objectives. It will trace those reorganization attempts from the second World War until the present time. And further, it will look

at other areas of our military complex that could be made more effective.

The world situation and military capabilities to deal with each situation are not static. They are constantly changing and must be dealt with on an individual basis. Any attempt to prescribe detailed procedures for all future or even present contingencies is ludicrous. It is better to provide clear, strategic objectives at the national command level and allow subordinate organizations the latitude, control and resources to attain these objectives.

But the objectives must be realistic and control and responsibility must also be realistic. A totally centralized control, except in global, all-out nuclear war, is too unwieldy to be effective. So, too, is a completely decentralized concept, in which all the various components are attempting to accomplish their own specific objectives without coordinating their actions. Unity of command and prioritizing the use of available resources is necessary at all levels and is the only way that military action can be both efficient and effective.

At the present time, the individual services are set up as totally separate entities. Each is largely self-sufficient and is made up of its own support systems. The services have their own supply, intelligence, communication, and medical branches. In addition, they all provide their

own training, recruiting, and administration for their fighting forces.

Due to specialization in functional areas, land, sea, and air forces, and the complexity of modern warfare, there has been more coordination between the services, i.e., Army-Air Force in the AirLand Battle and Marine Corps-Navy during amphibious operations. But, there is still a vast amount of redundancy between the services and each service operates according to its own doctrine.

With the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, emphasis has shifted from the individual services autonomy to that of Joint Operations. As such, the Department of Defense has undergone major reorganization. The roles of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have increased as have the roles of the Commanders-in-Chief of the various major commands worldwide.

Joint Task Force employment has now moved to the forefront of military planning. But these actions are receiving mixed reactions from members of the military services as well as the Congressional defense committees. Many questions remain unanswered.

- Will Joint operations provide a more efficient warfighting force or is the separate service and mission concept more effective?
- Has the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act gone far enough, or should further reorganization

proceed to include a fully integrated, "purple suit," defense department instead of separate services?

- Will the area commanders-in-chief have the necessary power and resource control to effectively fight and win any conflict that could arise?
- How should individual service missions be defined and accomplished and how should resources be allocated to meet those missions?
- What improvements are still necessary to coordinate joint operations and make the Joint Task Force an efficient fighting force?

By examining these questions, I will point out some areas that are still deficient. Through concerted effort, these areas can be made more efficient without losing the effectiveness within the department of defense and the individual services.

CHAPTER II

JUSTIFICATION FOR JOINT COOPERATION

The problems of joint operations are not new. There have been difficulties encountered coordinating joint operations as long as combined military missions have existed. There have been campaigns where coordination between the services has been excellent, as it was in Vietnam and the majority of World War II; however, the need for improvement became clear. This section will explore some of the operations of the last hundred years and examine the difficulties experienced by the various services and the resulting impact on the outcome of the mission. (6:354-370)

Spanish American War

At the time of the Spanish-American War, the military was comprised of the Department of War and the Department of the Navy.

The Spanish-American War witnessed not only the failure of the Army and the Navy to cooperate on military planning, but also the lack of coordination within the Military Departments themselves. (6:354)

Without a central command structure, such as the Secretary of Defense, there was no unity of command. The Navy itself remained divided between Havana and Key West. This lack of command unity continued throughout the campaign, leaving the fleet, as well as the overall military command structure, divided.

The only joint campaign of the Spanish-American War was also marred by the inability of United States forces to agree on the strategies and tactics to be utilized. Admiral Sampson and General Shafter, the Navy and Army commanders, repeatedly disagreed.

Shafter repeatedly insisted that the Navy force the entrance to the harbor of Santiago and aid the Army in the capture of the city. Sampson refused to enter the mine-infested harbor, insisting instead that the Army attack the formidable forts guarding the entrance to the harbor so that his forces could safely remove the mines before entering the harbor. (6:355)

The Army won the Cuban campaign with little help from the Navy. But the conflict between the two services resulted in "the creation of General Staff of the Army, the General Board of the Navy, and the Joint Board of the Army and Navy." (6:355)

Pearl Harbor

The separate chain of command for the Army and Navy continued until World War II. The command structure for the two services ran from their respective flag officer commanders up through their service chiefs and secretaries to the President in a manner in which "below the Presidential level, no one exercised authority over both commanders at Pearl Harbor." (6:355)

Without unity of command, below the President, there was no sharing of intelligence or coordination of surveillance operations in the Pacific. The incorrect assumption that the other service was performing surveillance, combined

with no integration of intelligence on Japanese operations, allowed the Japanese to successfully execute the surprise attack. While the Pacific campaign was an example of successful joint service coordination, there were specific battles such as Leyte Gulf, which was a major success despite the lack of command unity, where coordination came up lacking.

USS Pueblo

The 1968 capture of the intelligence gathering ship, USS Pueblo, further demonstrated the necessity of joint coordination.

Because U.S. military forces failed to assist the Pueblo from the beginning of the crisis until its arrival in Wonsan Harbor (about four hours), sensitive information and equipment were lost and the vessel's crew was imprisoned for 11 months by the North Koreans. This lack of action, in turn, can be traced to problems with the U.S. military command structure in the region--specifically, the lack of unification at levels subordinate to the unified commander." (6:358)

Incorrect assumptions were made with regards to assisting Pueblo. Unlike Leyte Gulf, however, the results were not favorable. Since the Commander, Naval Forces Japan (operational commander for the Pueblo) did not command any forces that could assist the endangered vessel, they requested aid from other commands. Breakdowns in communication caused a period of inaction that allowed the incident to proceed to the point that the ship could not be rescued by the existing forces.

If anyone of the nearby commanders had sufficient forces (individually) to deal with the Pueblo seizure, the crisis would have been entirely different. But the precise point is that no one commander had such forces and thus commanders were forced to rely on coordination, requests and assumptions about what others were doing. Two major reasons inherent in the command structure explain this result. There was no effective unity of command below CINCPAC and those links in the chain of command, CINCPAC and above, who possessed sufficient authority were too far away to influence the situation. (24:55-6)

While the incident was directly related to the lack of joint coordination, even with the numerous attempts to restructure the Department of Defense, the problem still exists.

Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission

The ill-fated Iranian hostage rescue attempt was probably the most widely publicized joint operation of recent years. The problems encountered in the planning, training, and execution of the rescue mission were complex and will not be addressed here in great detail, but only in general terms to point out the shortcomings of joint operations and the need for correction.

The most serious criticism of the organization of the rescue operation is the charge that all four services insisted on participating in the mission, even though the participation of all four was unnecessary or even harmful. In other words, each Service demanded a piece of the action. (6:361)

This view was further supported by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski in his testimony to the Senate Armed Forces.

One basic lesson [to be learned from the failure of the mission] is that interservice interests dictated very much the character of the force that was used. Every service wished to be represented in this enterprise and that did not enhance cohesion and integration. (20:503)

In addition to the planning of the specifics of the rescue mission, the actual training for the mission remained very compartmentalized. To further illustrate the lack of dedicated assets for joint operations, the two officers generally supervising the mission training were still working their regular assignments during the same period. (6:360)

In order for a joint operation to be successful, the command must pick only the most effective resources for the particular mission, regardless of the wishes of the individual services or the public relations advantages by multi-service organizations. He must totally dedicate those assets to the accomplishment of that mission.

Grenada

The joint Grenada operation in 1983, while successful, still had various severe shortcomings were still identified. During the planning stage, Army personnel had to be assigned to the Joint Task Force on an emergency basis.

"There was no unified ground commander (assigned) on the island, a matter which caused some problems. Additionally, some Air Force aircraft remained under the control of the Military Airlift Command." (6:364) The fact that the operation was a success does not forgive the lack of coordination, organization, and planning.

Further examples of the services' inability to coordinate and cooperate jointly were evident by the

incompatibility of communications equipment. This lack of interoperability left the Army unable to call in naval gunfire support. Mission changes were not received by various components and generally a state of confusion reigned over a large portion of the operation.

Participation by all members in the planning of the operation could have identified many of the shortcomings. There was no face-to-face coordination or planning between the major components of the task force. Logistics were not thought through, needed weapons were not supplied, vehicles were lacking and rations were inadequate. The fog and friction of war will provide enough confusion and shortfalls without amplifying the situation through poor organization.

CHAPTER III

DOD REORGANIZATION EFFORTS

The Congress and the military have both recognized the problems presented by combined operations. Since 1944 there have been no less than 35 major studies concerning the reorganization of the Department of Defense. (11:136-147). It appears these studies are initiated after any joint operation in which everything does not proceed according to plan. While reform actions are conducted and substantial changes have been made in good faith, there are still shortcomings that keep recurring in almost every joint undertaking.

History of the JCS

Shortly after entering World War II, "President Roosevelt informally approved the formation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This U.S. Staff had neither a legal mandate nor formally defined duties." (11:136). While only informally constructed, the JCS represented the United States military with the British in the combined Chiefs of Staff throughout the war. Without a formal structure, the Chiefs had "tremendous flexibility in the execution of their duties to handle the requirements of the war." (11:137) Disagreements were common and "during the war the chiefs reached an agreement only by numerous compromises and often long delays." (24:15)

After the war ended, numerous studies were initiated to attempt to find a structure that would provide an effective, more efficient running of the department of defense.

In his message to Congress on 19 December 1945 President Truman forcibly reminded the lawmakers that when the United States entered World War II there were two separate and independent departments of national defense, with no well-defined habits of coordination or cooperation. Nor was air power organized on an equal basis with the land and sea forces . . . unless Congress took further action within a limited time the departments would revert to their prewar organizational status. (16:8)

There were major movements during this period to unify the three military branches into one military service with a separate branch for land, air and sea forces. The final result of these studies was the National Security Act of 1947.

This postwar security act created a "new National Military Establishment with its component Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: and established the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a permanent organization. (7:54)

Under the new act the JCS became the principal military advisors to the President and Secretary of Defense. In addition to establishing a joint staff for JCS support, it gave specific guidance to JCS to:

- a) prepare strategic and joint logistical plans for the services;
- b) assign logistical responsibilities to the services;
- c) establish unified commands in strategic areas when such unified commands are in the interest of national security;

- d) formulate training and education policies for the three services;
- e) review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces. (11:138)

Numerous changes were made to the Department of Defense during the succeeding decades. The office of the Secretary of Defense was strengthened through the National Security Act of 1949. The 1949 legislation also increased the size of the Joint Staff and re-established the position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Commandant of the Marine Corps was also added to the JCS in 1952 and given equal status with regards to "matters that concerned the Marine Corps." (11:139).

President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 further strengthened the position of the chairman. This plan also removed the JCS from the chain of command and "transferred responsibility for the concept of operations to the unified commanders." (11:140).

Each of these modifications was an attempt to move away from individual service parochialism and toward a more coordinated Department of Defense.

The last major reorganization act of the post-war period came in 1958. Again, it was designed to move closer toward a more unified, coordinated department of defense. In President Eisenhower's words, "Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever . . . We must be prepared to fight as one, regardless of service."

The Reorganization Act of 1958 further strengthened and centralized the authority of the Secretary of Defense by:

- removing the individual secretaries from the military chain of command.
- removing command authority of the service chiefs over forces.
- insuring JCS could act only under the authority of the Secretary of Defense.
- transferring control of the Joint Staff from the individual chiefs to the Chairman.
- giving the chairman a vote in all deliberations.
- increasing the size of the Joint Staff.
- organizing the staff into the numbered directorates of a conventional military staff. (DOD Reorg of 1958).

The Department of Defense organization remained virtually unchanged (with the exception of promoting the Commandant of the Marine Corps to full Chief status in 1978) for the next 25 years.

In the early 1980s, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David C. Jones, and the Army Chief of Staff, General Edward C. Meyer, recommended further strengthening of the Chairman as well as decreasing the authority of civilian Secretaries below the Secretary of Defense. They also advocated increased power for the Commanders of the Unified Commands and providing more training and interaction between the services. These recommendations were the basis for the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Reorganization Act of 1983, which later died in the Senate unvoted. (11:140).

Another study in 1983 by Commander John L. Bryon

. . . attempted to remove any potential service bias conflicts with regards to missions from the advice given by the JCS to the President by a totally functional definition of the services. (4:68) This study proposed three separate services, each assigned to a separate mission area, Land War, War at Sea, and Strategic Deterrence.

While a division of responsibility of this type would provide definitive accountability by mission areas, it still does not adequately address a viable solution to problems arising from combined service operations. Joint operations and the difficulties encountered from multi-command chains remain as the principal goal in the various reorganization attempts.

The Goldwater-Nichols Bill of 1986 was no exception. The 1985 staff report to the Senate Armed Services committee, Defense Organization for the Need for Change (the basis for the Goldwater-Nichols Bill) recommended 91 changes in 16 specific areas. The study points out numerous weaknesses arising from lack of coordination and communication between the services. It also alluded to parochialism among some of the senior officers in unified commands that put the interests of the individual services above the good of joint effectiveness.

When the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 passed, joint cooperation emerged as a major goal among

the services. No longer did it exist only in theory but now jointness was specifically addressed by law.

All combatant commanders are to be joint specialists, or have had previous joint flag duty. In addition, a combatant commander is given veto power over the selection of subordinate commanders and also can require that he be advised of all communication between subordinate service component commanders and their respective service headquarters. Finally, each CINC now makes his own budget request as part of the defense budget, for funding joint exercises, force training, contingencies, and selected operations." (11:145)

By substantially increasing the authority of Chairman of JCS as well as specifying and magnifying the roles of the Unified CINCs, the groundwork has been laid for effective joint operations.

CHAPTER IV

THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986

The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater (R), Arizona, and Senator William Nichols (D), Alabama, has made the most sweeping changes yet experienced by the Department of Defense. This bill centralized the authority of the Joint Chiefs in just one person, the Chairman. It also gives more power to the Chairman, making him the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense, with the other service chiefs working through him.

The massive changes brought on by this bill not only increased the Chairman's power and created a Vice-Chairman to act in his absence, but also removed the service chiefs from the operational chain of command. It has placed the operational control in the hands of the Theater Commanders (CINCs) where the war will be fought. By increasing the role of the Theater CINCs, input will be received from the operators. Hopefully, this will increase the effectiveness of the war-fighting forces of the United States. The expanded authority extends not only through the operational chain, but also includes the authority for training, logistics, and budgeting overall organization of the theater structure.

Last but not least important of the changes caused by the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is the creation of the "joint specialty officer." All flag officers are to be joint specialists or at least have had some joint experience. In order to fulfill these requirements, professional military education procedures are undergoing changes to include joint training.

Assignment directives have also been revised to ensure that more officers receive the required training and experience to be effective working in the joint arena. More bite had been given to joint operations by the congressional requirement that promotion opportunities must be at least equal for officers serving in joint assignments compared to officers serving with their parent services.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS

Doctrine

Since the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Defense Reorganization Bill of 1986, there have been great strides taken to maximize the effectiveness of the Department of Defense with regards to joint operations. The joint staff has been enlarged and has undertaken the colossal task of rewriting much of the existing joint doctrine as well as developing new doctrine covering combined service functions.

(13:--)

But is this undertaking actually going to result in a more effective fighting force or will it in fact create more red tape and another paper mountain that must be managed, disseminated and paid for with already shrinking funds? This joint doctrine is being established in consonance with already existing individual service doctrines.

All the individual services operate according to their own procedures. The Army operates according to FM 100-5, the AirLand Battle and other related documents.

(2:--) These documents give specific guidance not only on actual campaign planning and various war and peacetime operations but continues on to specific deployment of individual weapon systems.

On the other end of the spectrum, the United States Navy operates with no specific doctrine, but in accordance with the Maritime Strategy. (23:--) This strategy establishes broad guidelines on Naval operations but does not attempt to give specific guidance for deployment of forces or warfighting. It is more a strategy of flexible response, dependent on the existing circumstances. There are accepted procedures for the operation of individual weapon systems, but the entire strategy is a much more general system than that under which the Army operates.

The United States Air Force and Marine Corps both operate somewhere in the middle of the spectrum between the Army and the Navy. Air Force Doctrine (1:--) and Marine Corps Doctrine (14:--) both provide specific guidance for procedures to be followed but more flexibility than the Army is given on employment of weapons systems.

As joint operations gain more strength, the Joint Staff has established an entirely new set of publications to prescribe how joint and combined operations should function. (13:--) They have redefined procedures for establishing joint doctrine that will, in effect, take precedence over individual services doctrine. The Joint Staff receives and refines inputs from all branches of the department of defense and combines these inputs into rules and guidance for the conduct of joint service operations.

The joint doctrinal process also assigns responsibility for developing doctrine to the specific services that are most closely related to that area. For example, the Navy has the responsibility of originating doctrine for anti-submarine warfare while the Air Force is the primary author of doctrine concerning close air support.

This joint doctrine, in essence, should create universal procedures for all the services that will allow for a smooth, coordinated evolution of events during joint operations. With specific doctrine the individual services should have a basic understanding of the other services' roles and a specific understanding of their own function which, in turn, makes joint warfare more effective and efficient.

But will joint doctrine accomplish its goal or does it create a whole new language that must be mastered, in addition to the language of the parent service, before a multi-service organization can function as a cohesive unit?

From the time military personnel enter their respective services, they are taught how to function, operate and fight as a part of that service. This learning process includes specific procedures, tactics and the individual vernacular of each of the services. Each service has its own language, acronyms and procedures. By increasing joint publications and procedures, there is the creation of a new universal language and procedures that personnel from all

the services should be able to understand and utilize in coordinated operations. But it also adds to the volume of knowledge by the introduction of new acronyms, different procedures and guidelines utilized when working as a combined force as opposed to those used when only one service is involved.

The Goldwater Nichols Bill has given more autonomy to the area commanders-in-chief. By utilizing one doctrine as a very general guideline, and allowing the area commanders total control of all forces within their areas of responsibility, a more effective warfighting capability could result.

Specific doctrine puts severe limitations on how forces may be employed and removes the autonomy of the commanders. At the present time there are various levels of organizations operating within the CINC's area, each with their own doctrine. Some of these forces do not operate under the control of the area commander but have their distinctly separate chains of command, i.e., special operations forces, and, in some instances, various service components such as carrier air wings and amphibious groups.

However, each of these components must be supported. Support forces are limited and must be shared between theater forces and other forces. The procedures for operating all the forces are set forth in the various doctrines that presently exist. This support requirement is

where the conflicts between priorities arise. By establishing joint doctrine that gives general guidance to the area commanders on National Policy and then allowing these senior officers the autonomy to decide how all the forces in their area would be utilized and supported, a more efficient use of the available resources can be realized.

If that autonomy is not given to the CINC's, the United States military will again run the risk of having more than one chain of command. As was seen in the Battle of Leyte Gulf and during the Pueblo incident, lack of unity of command over the total area forces at least leads to confusion and in the worst case can lead to disaster through inaction.

Joint Training

To make an effective warfighting organization, sound input must be received by the area commanders from all the services. The Goldwater Nichols Act established a joint specialist officer designation. It also required all theater commanders to be joint specialists. While this requirement is intended to enhance coordination between services, the exposure to joint operations, for most officers, does not come until the very senior officer level. To start at that level to learn a new language and begin to operate under a completely separate doctrine can be cumbersome, at least in the short-run, while the officers become accustomed to functioning in the joint arena.

Increasing joint exposure much earlier in their careers, at least by the company grade level, will make the transition much smoother. Earlier exposure and more extensive joint experience will also reduce parochialism among the services and enhance cooperation and effectiveness during joint operations.

Earlier exposure does not necessarily mean that all officers should receive joint assignments early in their career. Joint exposure can be increased through a number of methods. Military education needs to focus heavily on increased appreciation of combined operations and joint doctrine, as well as the traditional subjects of strategy tactics, leadership, and regional issues. This education cannot be allowed to wait until the intermediate and senior service schools but must be started at the lowest level possible.

Professional Military Education is not the only answer. Some of the services--the Navy in particular--do not have as large an output of formalized instruction to have a substantial impact on increased joint experience.

More joint exercises can effectively fill much of the void of those officers that is not filled through joint assignments and professional military training. These exercises will provide the impetus to efficient training. It will also serve to identify more shortcomings in joint effectiveness.

The exercises must be done realistically, however. Since most combined exercises are on a large scale, they are very costly. In these times of austere resources, great care has been taken to ensure that these exercises are successful. While all this long-term planning is politically smart, it does not bring calls for budget cuts due to wasted funds; it also does not give the experience in short-term planning and execution requirements that give rise to problems such as those experienced during the Grenada invasion. Since increased funding to accomplish joint exercises will probably not be forthcoming, the number of individual service operations will necessarily also have to be reduced.

Increased joint operations, both short-term and long-term will allow the meshing of the various service procedures into a more cohesive package. Joint operations will also enable the area commanders to make a realistic evaluation of the effectiveness of his forces and identify those areas that must be addressed.

Other areas that will come under close scrutiny through increased combined exercises are those that cross geographical and service boundaries. Specifically, the areas of logistics, intelligence gathering and prioritization of resources. Exercises are now planned so that scheduling conflicts are minimized with regards to

supporting services. However, in an actual conflict, these shortages will be more visibly manifest.

Admiral Kidd, in his article "For Our Nation, There Must Be Both Combat and Staying Power" (15:57-69), pointed out shortfalls in the number of resupply vessels in the case of an all-out conflict. The Invasion of Grenada also pointed out deficiencies in intelligence sharing as well as communications procedures between the various services, particularly when high degrees of classification are involved. (17:278-296)

As more experience in the joint arena is gained by officers participating in joint exercises, innovation and prioritization of limited support services should also be forthcoming. Only realistic execution of these exercises by the theater forces will show where shortcomings exist.

Joint Personnel Assignment

The need for increased effectiveness through joint service over individual service operations does not mean that the United States military should become one "purple suited" services. Canada switched to this concept and is in the process of reverting back to separate services now. (21:--)

One of the major strengths of our military, in addition to our economic and technological power, has always been the quality of leadership and tactical skill of our non-commissioned officers and junior officers. That high level

of expertise must continue if the United States expects to maintain its parity with the superior numbers of the Warsaw Pact. What is lacked in sheer numbers must be made up through innovation and leadership ingenuity.

Many of those leadership qualities are at least partially the result of organizational pride and esprit de corps. If the services were combined into one joint service, those old, established traditions could easily disappear.

Theoretically, combining the services probably has some merit. There would no longer be separate command structures nor separate training facilities or headquarters. It would eliminate much of the duplication of administrative efforts and create a more efficient organization.

Increased efficiency does not necessarily mean increased effectiveness, however. Those intangible qualities such as esprit de corps that can be derived from interservice rivalries and competition might not be the most efficient means to run an organization, but efficiency alone will not win a war; effectiveness can. Competition can also have a negative effect on an organization. However, if proper control and leadership is applied, competition among the services, as in the capitalist market, can provide the motivation for an organization to excel.

Another drawback to leadership effectiveness that could result from an overemphasis on jointness is a loss of

specialization of the combat leaders. This is not to say every effective combat leader must be an expert in all areas of warfighting, but in order to have any credibility or to gain an understanding of the 'operational art' of warfighting, he must first have a sound background in military tactics. That foundation cannot come from study and exposure alone but must also include personal experience in tactical decision making and application.

Combined Support Services

Not developing a single 'purple' service does not eliminate the efficiency that can be gained by combining certain functions within the various services. The U.S. Transportation Command has already been established to make more efficient use of the limited logistics resource available. By providing logistical support to all theater commanders based on priorities set by the area CINCs and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Transportation Command can direct its support to the commands where they will be the most effective.

This same concept could also be applied to other areas as well. Communication, intelligence, supply, and medical could be just as effective and definitely more efficient as unified commands.

These functional areas, while not completely redundant throughout the individual services, lend themselves

very well to increased efficiency and effectiveness in joint operations.

By establishing a joint supply system and allowing the area commanders to set their own priorities, much the same as the Transportation Command, the most needed supplies and repair parts would receive priority treatment and backlogs caused by port overcrowding while awaiting transportation could be reduced. This joint system would not eliminate the individual services' logistics systems. It would, however, connect each system with the others through interoperable computers.

Through the combined computer services now utilized by the individual services, standardization of ordering and shipping procedures could greatly reduce turn-around time. Shipping status could also be more easily tracked through a master supply system by tracking supply movements through one system for the war commanders instead of depending on the four services to provide the support for their forces assigned to the joint command.

While a master or joint supply system would be difficult and expensive to set up, it would lend itself well to the Unified Transportation Command that is already established. The technology for such a system already exists and is in use by numerous major commercial organizations such as Nissan and Toyota. (5:--) A joint supply system prioritized by the area CINCs instead of the individual services also

eliminates added procedures now required by having to order all supplies through parent service supply systems.

Like supply system redundancies, problems in accessibility of intelligence can be reduced through increased joint cooperation. The Defense Intelligence Agency serves this purpose for the Joint Chiefs of Staff but complete access to all intelligence concerning their area of responsibility is essential if the CINCs are to effectively employ their forces. As was determined in Grenada, this common accessibility is not always the case. (17:278-296)

Combining the intelligence forces of all the individual branches into one parent organization would increase their efficiency by expanding the intelligence exchange network and placing it under one centralized control. It would also increase the warfighting effectiveness of the Joint Commanders by establishing a central source of needed intelligence.

Probably the greatest shortfall in interoperability of joint forces is in the area of communications. Much progress has been made since Grenada but the situation has not yet been completely corrected. Standardization of codes and communication procedures must be established if joint operations are ever to be successful. As was demonstrated so clearly in Grenada, ineffective communications between forces exacerbate problems even more than having the forces

operating totally separate from one another. Planning for coordinated mission completion only to have it left unaccomplished due to a lack of communication between coordinating forces only adds to the fog of war.

Joint communication support and procurement forces and procedures to standardize communications interoperability between the various operational forces are required to identify standardization and equipment problems and establish procedures to rectify them. Not only will the interoperability of communication services increase the effectiveness of joint commands, but by allowing for the interchange of communications equipment between the services efficiency and long-run cost savings are also possible.

Even more easily than communications, intelligence and supply, medical support lends itself to a central control instead of control by the individual branches of the military. There could still be specialization in the medical forces and specific requirements for supported personnel from the parent services. But by combining recruiting, training and administrative functions of the medical forces from all the services into one command and giving that command the responsibility for supporting the military, priorities can be assigned and support effectiveness maximized.

Joint Specialist Program

Probably the most controversial aspect of the Goldwater Nichols Bill, at least for the individual services, is the establishment of the Joint Specialist Officer. The bill requires all theater commanders to be Joint Specialists. It also identified the need for over 1,000 critical joint billets that must be filled by certified joint specialists. (11:--)

In order to fully qualify as a joint specialist, an officer must either attend a joint curriculum service school and be assigned to a follow-on billet in a joint, unified or combined command for at least two years or perform satisfactorily in two separate joint assignments.

Not everyone who attends a service school goes through the joint curriculum. Also, with all the career requirements prescribed by the individual services, many, if not most, career officers are not able to meet the joint specialty requirements until very late in their careers. It also prevents assignment of many top performing officers to key joint billets because they have not had the required formal training or a previous joint assignment. By placing these stringent requirements on joint staff assignment, a vast amount of operational and tactical experience is lost to the joint services.

However, as joint operations and exercises become more commonplace, the need for this type of qualification

will no longer be required. Familiarity with the services' capabilities, as well as standardization in general doctrine and interoperability between services will grow as priorities continue to shift from the individual services to joint functions.

Keeping a separate joint specialist program, in the short-run, will provide a cadre of officers who can speak and hopefully think 'joint'. However, by increasing the exposure of all personnel to joint capabilities and procedures through formal education, joint assignments and increased frequency of joint exercises, all personnel will become more familiar and be able to function effectively with other services. Extensive efforts to standardize doctrine, language and interoperability will eliminate the need for separate joint specialists.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

What direction the military organizations should go from here is still open to debate. Joint service cooperation has become law but there are still different directions that the military may follow. Increased authority for the Chairman gives the military a unified voice. Technically, the individual service chiefs are no longer in the operational chain of command, in favor of the area commanders.

But, the way that the area commanders are supported by the individual services leaves much room for continued parochialism. The services provide the forces, training, and equipment required by each joint commander. The services also exercise considerable control over budget requests that include manning some of the logistics for the commanders.

The services must achieve goal congruence (in their separate missions) in order to become truly effective as a joint force. The national leadership must provide the general objectives and assign those objectives to the most appropriate force without regard to individual service interests. At times, this assignment will be to an individual service or to a combined force from all the services. To succeed as such a force, the services must learn how to operate with each other. Smooth communication, both from

equipment and common language, and unity of command are essential ingredients of a successful joint operation. Interdependence and familiarity between the services and strict delineation of and adherence to the joint command structure must be the goal to meet the challenges of the complex defense requirements with the dwindling resources.

History has clearly shown the need for reform in the United States military organization. From the Spanish America War until the invasion of Grenada, there have been problems arising from disparity of objectives among the forces involved as well as from the lack of command unity. The inability to communicate between cooperating forces, due to separate language (doctrine) or the incompatibility of equipment, as was the case in Grenada, have proved to be a major stumbling block to effective joint operations.

Attempts to reorganize the Department of Defense have been ongoing since World War II when the complexity of war rose to such a level that individual service operations can no longer be decisive except in low intensity actions of very short duration such as the 1986 raid on Libya. Even with these limited actions, the range and complexity of modern weapons systems demand cooperation between the services if the campaign is to be successful. As the scope of the conflict increases, so does the need for cooperation. Logistics support such as refueling, airlift and sealift of

troops and supplies and cooperating combat force employment make joint operations a necessity.

Maximizing the effectiveness of available fighting forces has become even more necessary as our global commitments continue to grow as available resources become even more scarce. It is not difficult to be successful if numbers are vastly in our favor as they were in Grenada. But, force requirements have stretched so far worldwide that numbers superiority will probably not be the case. To counter this shortage of resources, the U.S. must use superior leadership, technology and innovation.

Each reorganization act passed by Congress has been aimed at more efficient and effective use of forces. In order to create a truly more effective force, the status quo and service parochialism must be changed. Resistance has been encountered from various fronts, ranging from the individual services to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Individual interests must be set aside in favor of accomplishing national objectives as established by the national command structure. Each service must be responsible for not only their own functional areas, land, sea, air and strategic deterrence, but also for supporting the accomplishment of the overall joint mission as well.

Changes brought on by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 have transferred the emphasis and control of the military from the individual services to a

joint perspective by increasing the authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the area commanders. This shift of emphasis has not eliminated parochialism because forces must still be trained, equipped, and provided by each parent service to the joint command. But, it is a step in the right direction.

The Goldwater-Nichols legislation has opened the door for a much more effective military organization. The complexities of modern warfare demands a coordinated effort on land, at sea, and in the air. But further steps are necessary to maximize the effectiveness of the limited available resources. Separate services are all essential in meeting national objectives but none can win on their own.

How these services combine to form a joint force will be dependent upon the leadership of the Chairman and the Area Commanders. If we are to fight as we train, the services must become familiar with each others' capabilities and shortcomings. Each Commander must be allowed the flexibility to employ his forces in the most effective manner. A single joint doctrine needs to be adopted so that all forces are speaking the same language. Doctrine should also be general guidelines that give the commander the needed freedom of action to win with the forces allocated or if that force is insufficient, priorities must be established for augmenting forces from other commands. Prioritization

will also allow for the needed unity of command required by any military action.

Doctrine for combined operations does not stop with just the warfighters. Support services must be utilized efficiently to effectively support the area commanders. Intelligence information and logistics must be current and accessible in order to wage a successful campaign. Combining the assets of all the individual services into one network will give wider range of information on which to base command decisions. Lack of current intelligence and timely logistical support need not be as limited as it was in Grenada. Pooling of assets and giving prioritization authority to the area commanders will allow more efficiency for support.

Joint doctrine does not necessitate combining all the services into one "purple suit" service. One of the strengths of the U.S. military and one avenue to defeating superior numbers, has been the superior leadership of the junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Unit pride and esprit de corps resulting from tradition and mutual goals have been linked to extraordinary efforts and provide the impetus for this superior leadership.

Training as we fight also applies to how the military conducts its exercises. Long-range planning for all major exercises is a luxury that we can ill afford. While it may at times be politically expedient, we must

fight with just the assets available and practice short-term planning as well. This does not eliminate contingency planning nor single service exercises, but the focus must shift to joint operations in varying scales and locations.

The thrust of joint operations cannot be limited only to joint staff and joint specialist officers. By increasing joint exposure for all officers through education and exercises, all officers will become more familiar and eventually more effective in the joint arena.

These reorganization attempts should not be construed as trying to make the military more like a civilian corporation. They have different goals, restrictions and methods, and while a major corporation such as General Motors has a major impact on the nation's and world economy, the significance pales in comparison with the impact of the military complex. However, like a successful corporation, the military must establish objectives, assess the situation and develop a course of action with the resources available. The resources are continuing to decrease while commitments increase and the only way to meet our commitments is through cooperation.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act is a step in the right direction but until the services fully accept the legislation and the Department of Defense truly starts acting as a single organization, the bureaucratic stumbling blocks and

additional red tape created by the concept will prevent the military from becoming as effective as it could be.

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